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Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal
Revenue Service Investigations
Gene A. Petersen*
I. HISTORY AND POLICY OF THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The notion that an attorney should not be compelled to dis-
close communications made to him by a client in confidence has
its origin in early Roman law.' While the extent of influence, if
any, of the Roman experience is not clear,2 the basic principle of
privileged communication between a lawyer and his client did
gain common law recognition in the early sixteenth century as
the use of compulsory testimony became an authorized source of
proof in common law courts.3
The original justification for the existence of the privilege
was that "the oath and the honor" of the attorney would be
violated if he were compelled to disclose the secrets of his client.4
By the eighteenth century, however, the importance of the attor-
ney's express or implied pledge of secrecy diminished in relation
to the significance of ascertaining the truth in judicial proceed-
ings.' With the repudiation of this doctrine, a new theory was
offered to support the existence of the privilege, based on the
client's need to consult freely and frankly with his legal advisor.
Only if the client confides all facts and circumstances can the
attorney give accurate advice and provide accurate represen-
tation. Such full disclosure can be expected, however, only if
the client is convinced that his attorney cannot be compelled to
disclose statements made in confidence to the attorney. 6
While this theory has enabled the attorney-client privilege
to remain a viable legal doctrine, it has not been without critics.7
* Member, Illinois Bar.
1. See C. McComwcK, EvIDENcE § 91 (1954); Radin, The Privilege
of Confidential Communication Beween Lawyer and Client, 16 CAIw. L.
RIv. 487, 488 (1928).
2. See C. McCoymICK, supra note 1, § 91.
3. See 8 J. WiOmoRE, EvmENcE § 2290 (3. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
4. Id.
5. See C. McConmcK, supra note 1, § 91.
6. See generally C. McCoRmvcK, supra note 1, § 91; 8 3. WGMoRE,
supra note 3, §§ 2290-91; Radin, supra note 1.
7. The arguments for and against the privilege are presented
and thoroughly analyzed in 8 J. WIGMOrE, supra note 3, § 2291.
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Irrespective of objective merits or weaknesses in the doctrine's
rationale, however, the confidential nature of the attorney-client
relationship is now so deeply rooted in American legal history
that it seems safe to say that the privilege will never be
abolished.8 Nevertheless, as Wigmore has stated:
Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is
plain and concrete .... It is worth preserving for the sake of
a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the investi-
gation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its prin-
ciple.9
II. THE PRIVILEGE AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PROCEEDINGS
The most often quoted statement of the privilege is that of
Dean Wigmore:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a pro-
fessional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communi-
cations relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived.10
Without reference to or recognition of the privilege, however,
section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, using broad
phraseology, authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to subpoena
individuals and documents for examination."l
Nevertheless, on only one occasion has the Internal Revenue
8. Cf. C. McCoamvcx, supra note 1, § 91.
9. 8 J. WIGmoPE, supra note 3, § 2291 at 554.
10. Id. § 2292 at 554.
11. § 7602 provides in part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any re-
turn, .. . determining the liability of any person for any in-
ternal revenue tax, . . or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data
which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;(2) To summon the person liable for tax. . . or any per-
son having possession, custody, or care of books of account
containing entries relating to the business of the person liable
for tax .... or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear . . . and to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony,
under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry
The subpoena or summons is enforced by filing an action in the fed-
eral district court requesting compliance. See INT. REv. CODE or 1954,
§§ 7402(b), 7604(a). If the subpoenaed party has refused to comply
because of a claimed attorney-client privilege, he must base his defense
in the district court enforcement proceeding on the privilege.
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Service contended that the attorney-client privilege is inapplica-
ble to proceedings under section 7602. In United States v.
Summe 12 the IRS sought an order compelling an attorney to
answer certain questions concerning the income tax returns of
two of his clients. The government responded to the claim of
privileged communication by asserting that "the attorney-client
privilege has no application to an examination under section
7602 . *.. ,13 While the opinion is confusing, the court appears
to hold that since the privilege derives from common law and
hence does not depend upon a statute, and since there is no au-
thority squarely holding that the privilege does not apply in
federal investigative proceedings, "it is therefore necessary that
the court proceed on the premise that the attorney-client privilege
must be recognized at this investigation."'14 Conspicuously ab-
sent from the court's opinion is any attempt to construe the
specific language of the statute. Since the power of Congress to
bar testimonial privileges in agency proceedings can hardly be
questioned, it would seem that the court should have dealt
directly with the government's suggestion that the statute itself
precluded the privilege.' 5
The Civil Aeronautics Board has repeatedly contended that
under similarly broad investigatory powers conferred on it by
the Federal Aviation Act,16 the attorney-client privilege is not
available in proceedings before itYt The Board's rationale is that
the statutory authorizations carry a congressional mandate for
"untrammeled powers of visitation" and therefore doctrines of
privilege must yield to "the concept of the agencies' need to
know."18 When this argument was finally presented to a federal
12. 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
13. Id. at 926. The government's theory was essentially that the
proceeding involved was a tax investigation only and not a court pro-
ceeding, thus making rule 43 (a), FED. R. Civ. P., which requires applica-
tion of state rules of evidence in certain federal court proceedings,
inapplicable.
14. Id. at 927. See Note, Privileged Communications Before Fed-
eral Administrative Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts,
31 U. Cm. L. REv. 395, 402-03 (1964).
15. See Note, supra note 14, at 403-04. But see Louisell, Con-fidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Courts
Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 119-20 (1956).
16. "The Board shall at all times have access to ... all accounts,
records, and memoranda, including all documents, papers, and corre-
spondence, now or hereafter existing, and kept or required to be kept by
air carriers. . . ." Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1377 (e) (1958).
17. See 2 Av. L. REP. f 17,153.121 (1966). See generally Miller,
The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REV. 262
(1963).
18. Memorandum of Plaintiff at 10, CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of
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district court in CAB v. Air Transportation Association of
America,19 the court disposed of the Board's contention in sum-
mary fashion, stating:
The attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded and is
part of the warp and woof of the common law. In order to
abrogate it in whole or in part as to any proceeding whatso-
ever, affirmative legislative action would be required that is free
from ambiguity. The very existence of the right of counsel ne-
cessitates the attorney-client privilege in order that a client and
his attorney may communicate between themselves freely and
confidentially.2 0
Based on the tenor of the decisions in these two judicial
challenges to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in
agency investigatory proceedings, it seems assured that the priv-
ilege will, in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary,
remain available.
III. THE CHOICE OF LAW DILEMMA
The vast majority of the reported decisions involving the
attorney-client privilege in agency investigations have assumed
it to be applicable, often relying on the statement of Judge
Learned Hand, made some thirty years ago, that "the conduct of
investigations under these statutes is subject to the same testi-
monial privileges as judicial proceedings." 2 ' Of more immediate
concern has been the question of whether the scope of the privi-
lege is to be determined by federal common law or by state
law.22 Initially it should be pointed out that in the vast majority
of cases involving the attorney-client privilege, the choice of law
problem will not affect the result since the federal common law
of attorney-client privilege is based to a large extent on state
decisions.2 3 Only in those few cases where the scope of the
privilege under federal common law is materially different from
America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961), quoted in Miller, supra note
17, at 264-65.
19. 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961).
20. Id. at 318. While there was some indication that the Board
would appeal the decision, it apparently did not do so. See Miller,
supra note 17, at 264.
21. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937).
22. See Burroughs, Attorney-Client Privilege: How Far Can an
Attorney Go in Protecting His Client?, 23 J. TAXATION 248, 250 (1965);
Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19
TAx L. REv. 405, 407-13 (1964); Orkin, The Attorney-Client Privilege
in Tax Matters, 49 A.B.A.J. 794 (1963); Note, supra note 14, at 398-405.
23. See Lofts, supra note 22, at 408, 412-13. Cf. United States v.
Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Ky. 1962); Orkin, supra note 22, at 795.
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that under state decisions or statutes will the choice of law
question be of importance. What makes this a problem of great
significance, however, is the fact that many states have stat-
utorily created other forms of privileged communication not
recognized by the common law, such as that between an account-
ant and his client or a physician and his patient. Thus, if the
law governing the attorney-client privilege is federal common
law, it most certainly also governs the question of whether an
accountant-client or physician-patient privilege exists and state
attempts to create such privileges would be ineffective. It is on
this basis that the question deserves thorough analysis.
At the outset, it should be understood that the question
presented is not directly whether rules of privilege are "sub-
stantive" or "procedural" under the doctrine of Erie Railroad
Company v. Tomkins, 24 as modified by Hanna v. Plumer,25 since
diversity jurisdiction is not involved in tax investigation pro-
ceedings. Of concern here is the problem of whether federal or
state law should control the existence and scope of testimonial
privileges in administrative and district court proceedings to en-
force administrative subpoenas or orders to give testimony.2 6
An analysis of the confusion must begin with Falsone v. United
States,27 one of the early cases discussing the availability of a
state-created privilege in a federal tax investigation.
In Falsone a certified public accountant was served with a
summons by a Treasury agent directing him to appear before the
agent and to produce various workpapers, records and mem-
oranda which were used in preparing a client's tax return. He
appeared but refused to testify or produce the records. The
Internal Revenue Service obtained a district court order directing
him to comply. The accountant responded by filing a motion
to vacate the order and quash the summons, which was denied.
On appeal the accountant contended that the proceeding was a
civil case governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure un-
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). This question has been judicially an-
alyzed quite recently, however. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d
320 (1964).
26. This is one aspect of the broader problem of whether the
availability and scope of testimonial privileges can be controlled by
state law in non-diversity cases. See Louisell, supra note 15; Pugh,
Rule 43(a) and the Communication Privileged Under State Law: An
Analysis of Confusion, 7 Vmi-. L. REv. 556 (1954). See also Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 320 (1964).
27. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
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der which state law controls the availability of testimonial privi-
leges. 28 Therefore, Falsone argued, the accountant-client privi-
lege statute of Florida, where the case arose, should control,
making his records and testimony immune to discovery.
The court noted federal rule 81 (a) (3) which provides that
the rules are applicable "to proceedings to compel the giving of
testimony or production of documents in accordance with a
subpoena issued by any officer or agency of the United States
under any statute of the United States. .. ." but drew a dis-
tinction between the judicial enforcement action and the agency
proceeding.29 In the court's view, the issue before it was whether
the privilege was available before the agency and not whether it
could be asserted in the enforcement proceeding, thus making
the Federal Rules and, therefore, the state-created accountant-
client privilege inapplicable.30
Falsone must be compared with the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Baird v. Koerner.3 1 In Baird a tax
attorney was summoned to identify certain clients for whom he
had made an anonymous payment of back taxes. He appeared
before the agent but declined to name any of the parties in-
volved, asserting the attorney-client privilege. The Internal
Revenue Service then filed a motion in the district court to
compel the defendant to testify and the defendant in turn filed
a motion to dismiss and to quash, which was denied. The de-
28. Even assuming this proceeding to be a "civil proceeding," it is
arguable whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure compel applica-
tion of state law to determine the existence and scope of testimonial
privileges. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a), discussed infra note 54, and
accompanying text.
29. The court stated:
[Rule 81(a) (3)] means that the rules are applicable to the
court action to enforce the summons .... To contend that
the proceeding itself before the Commissioner or the Internal
Revenue agent is also a civil case subject to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, and particularly to Rule 43(a) as to the admissi-
bility of evidence, would be going too far .... Clearly ...
Rule 81(a) (3) ... was not intended to make so radical a
change in administrative procedure as to require that such
agencies be restricted by the rigid rules of evidence. 205 F.2d
at 742.
30. Accord, In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d
122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954). The importance of
this view is emphasized when the Falsone case is compared to the de-
cision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9;h Cir. 1960), discussed infra
note 31, and accompanying text. Cf. Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of
Accountants in Federal Tax Fraud Investigations, 17 TAx L. REv. 491,
494-500 (1962); Note, supra note 14, at 401, 407-08; Comment, 49 CA.a.
L. REV. 382, 384 (1961).
31. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
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fendant then appeared before the judge and was instructed to
disclose the identity of the parties involved.32 He again refused,
asserting that the information was privileged; he was found
guilty of civil contempt and appealed. Thus, the issue squarely
before the appeallate court was whether the claim of privilege
could be asserted in the enforcement proceeding itself, not
whether it was available before the Internal Revenue Service as
in Falsone.3  On the precise question before it, the Baird court
properly held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
applicable.3 4 In applying federal rule 43 (a), the court held
that the law of the forum state "should and does" control the
question of the availability of the privilege in the enforcement
proceeding35 and that under California law the identities of the
clients were protected in these particular circumstances. 6
The procedural distinction drawn by these two decisions is
difficult to support. Certainly the defendant's right to refrain
from responding should not turn on whether the judge orders
him to comply in court or before the Internal Revenue Service.
If federal common law is to control the existence or scope of the
privilege before the agency, and state law is to control in the
enforcement proceeding if the privilege is asserted there, then a
privilege in one proceeding can be nullified by an order to
testify in the other. As a practical matter it seems obvious that
any claim of privilege must be tested by reference to the same
body of law in both the agency investigation and the enforce-
ment proceeding if consistent results are to be assured.37
Irrespective of the persuasiveness of the procedural dis-
32. Id. at 627.
33. See Fahey, supra note 30, at 494-500; Comment, 109 U. PA. L.
Rav. 1030, 1032 (1961).
34. Although not cited by the court, rule 81(a) (3) clearly justi-
fies the court's application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
35. 279 F.2d at 632. The propriety of the court's application of
rule 43 (a) in such a way as to find state law controlling is discussed
infra note 54, and accompanying text.
36. Another argument used by the court to support the application
of state law was that since federal courts accept the requirements of
the forum state for the practice of law, they must also follow the state
law concerning the attorney-client relation. This conclusion does not
seem to follow from the premise. Cf. Comment, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 382,
384 (1961).
37. Cf. Fahey, supra note 30, at 498-99; Comment, 109 U. PA. L.
Ray. 1030, 1032 (1961). The question of whether the controlling law




tinction drawn by Falsone and Baird, however, it is important
to recognize that both cases are consistent in their application of
the distinction. The inference is clear in Falsone that had the
question of the availability of the privilege been raised in the pro-
cedural fashion in which it was later raised in Baird, the Falsone
court would have applied state law under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and thus presumably have recognized the state-
created accountant-client privilege there claimed.38 Recent de-
cisions involving claims of privilege before administrative agen-
cies, particularly the Internal Revenue Service, have, however,
failed to recognize that Baird and Falsone are consistent in their
procedural approach to the choice of law problem. They seem
content, in the main, to state erroneously that Baird and Fal-
sone are in direct conflict as to whether state or federal law
controls the availability of a privilege before an administrative
agency.39  Accordingly, without a meaningful analysis of
whether the Baird-Falsone approach to the choice of law prob-
lem is a sound one or of which body of law should control, they
simply conclude that either the Baird view or the Falsone view
is correct and correspondingly apply either state or federal law.4 0
A major source of this confusion is the decision of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Colton v. United States.41
In Colton an attorney was summoned by the Internal Rev-
enue Service to appear before an agent to give testimony and to
produce certain records relating to the tax return of a client.
The attorney appeared but refused to respond to certain of the
questions or to turn over any of the records, claiming that such
information came within the attorney-client privilege. A mo-
tion to quash the summons was denied and the attorney ap-
38. See Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir.
1953); Fahey, supra note 30, at 498; Comment, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 382,
384 n.13 (1961). In FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.
1962) a similar procedural alignment was recognized, although the
court's statement reveals some confusion:
Baird v. Koerner . . . is distinguishable from the case at
bar because the appeal there was from a judgment of civil
contempt against an attorney for his refusal to comply with a
District Court order to identify, in an Internal Revenue Service
inquiry, his client. We agree with that court that that case
was ... a civil case". . . . The Falsone appeal was not from ajudgment of contempt but, although an Internal Revenue pro-
ceeding, was from an order similar to the one before us.
There is no inconsistency, therefore, between the view of the
court in Baird v. Koerner and the decision in Falsone that such
an administrative proceeding is not a civil case. Id. at 734-35.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.
Tenn. 1965); United States v. Ladner, 238 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Miss. 1965).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
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pealed. On the question of whether state or federal law con-
trolled the availability of the privilege the court stated:
At the outset, we reiterate our view, stated in In re Albert
Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital. .. , that questions of privilege
in a federal income tax investigation are matters of federal law.
See Falsone v. United States .... For the reasons stated
•. . , we do not agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Baird v. Koerner .... that a hearing held by the In-
ternal Revenue Service under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 is a "civil action" governed by state evidence law
under Rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,...
or that state law should govern for any other reason.42
From the discussion of the Baird case above, it should be appar-
ent that the Colton court misread the Baird opinion since the
latter held that the enforcement proceeding, not the agency
hearing, was governed by the Federal Rules. The view taken in
Colton, however, would bring Baird into direct conflict with
Falsone and recent decisions have aligned the cases accordingly.
Thus in United States v. Threlkeld,43 a district court proceeding
to enforce an Internal Revenue Service summons to testify and
produce documents before an agent, the court stated:
[R]espondent relies on the state created privilege. Peti-
tioner contends, on the other hand, that only federal law is
applicable. Although there is authority that state law should
govern (Baird v. Koerner ... ), Colton v. United States ...
holds that federal law governs and this is the better reasoned
opinion. 44
In a similar proceeding, the court in United States v. Ladner4
noted the government's reliance on Falsone and Colton, but held
that Baird was controlling and thus state law governed the claim
of privilege.46
Other anomalous decisions have resulted from this confused
line of cases. In In re Bretto,47 for example, involving an en-
forcement proceeding on an Internal Revenue Service summons,
the District Court for Minnesota noted that the government
and the defendant agreed that state law governed the claim of
attorney-client privilege.48  Of interest also is Love v. United
42. Id. at 636.
43. 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
44. Id. at 326.
45. 238 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Miss. 1965).
46. Id. at 896. Commentators also have failed to recognize the
procedural alignment of Falsone, Baird and Colton. "[Tlhe decision
... in Baird ... is in direct conflict with [Falsone and Colton]."
Burroughs, supra note 22, at 250. Cf. Balter, A Ten Year Review of
Fraud Prosecutions, N.Y.U. 19TH INsT. oN FED. TAx. 1125, 1155 (1961);
Orkin, supra note 22, at 794-95.
47. 231 F. Supp. 529 (D. Minn. 1964).
48. Id. at 531.
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States,49 involving a criminal prosecution under the Dyer Act,
in which the court held, citing Baird, that "this court is bound
by the law of the forum state on the question of privileged
communications. '50 This statement seems clearly incorrect,51
inasmuch as rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress
or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.
Thus it appears that the perplexity which has surrounded the
question of choice of law governing a claim of privilege before
an agency has now become a source of confusion in the field of
criminal law.
The most unsatisfactory aspect, however, of the muddled
interpretations of Falsone and Baird is that in subsequent de-
cisions, the courts did not find it necessary to undertake a
meaningful analysis of the question of whether state or federal
law should control the availability of a privilege before an
agency such as the Internal Revenue Service.52 In order to
make such an analysis, thought must be given to the formulative
judicial opinions in the area and to important policy con-
siderations which weigh heavily in any decision affecting the
delicate structure of state-federal relations.
It has been noted previously that the distinction drawn by
Falsone and Baird between the agency investigation and the en-
forcement proceeding cannot be maintained. The law governing
one proceeding must, as a practical matter, govern the other.53
Nevertheless, an analysis of the rationale of Baird in applying
state law will be helpful. The Baird court placed primary re-
liance on rule 43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides in part:
A.1 evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence
heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence
applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the United States court is held.
From this, the court reasoned that since there was no federal
49. 386 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 985 (1968).
50. Id. at 265.
51. Cf. United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525, 529-32
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
52. See notes 39-40 supra, and accompamying text.
53. See note 37 supra, and accompanying text.
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statute or rule governing privilege in civil cases,54 and since the
old equity courts had apparently followed state statutes on the
question of privilege,55 it could be inferred that the law of the
forum state should be applied.56 While the court's analysis of
the rule on its face may be valid, its applicability to the precise
situation before the court is questionable. Though it may be
conceded that under rule 81 (a) (3) the Federal Rules are applica-
ble to the enforcement proceeding,57 the Baird court failed to
realize that in so applying the Rules to the question of privilege
it was, for all intents and purposes, also applying them to the
administrative hearing before the Internal Revenue Service. 58
This result seems clearly contrary to the intentions of the draft-
ers of the Federal Rules 9 and, by inference at least, to the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court.6 0
The Baird court's reasoning can also be criticized on the
basis of rule 43 (a) itself since, in addition to that portion quoted
above, it provides: "In any case, the statute or rule which
favors the reception of the evidence governs . . . ." Thus, al-
though rule 43 (a) was intended to promote broad admissibility,
the Baird court utilized it to apply a state exclusionary rule.6'
In United States v. Brunner,2 the Sixth Circuit relied on this
aspect of rule 43 (a) in refusing to allow a claim of privilege
under a state statute making confidential communications be-
tween husband and wife inadmissible.6 3
It has also been contended 4 that under the Rules of De-
54. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1960).
55. Id. The practice of the old equity courts is somewhat in doubt,
however. Cf. 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 43.07 (1968); Green, The
Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HAnv. L. REv. 197,
208-09 (1941).
56. 279 F.2d at 628.
57. See note 29 supra, and accompanying text.
58. See note 37 supra, and accompanying text.
59. [Tihe provision allows full recognition of the fact that the
rigid application of the rules in the proceedings themselves
may conflict with the summary determination desired. Notes
of the Advisory Comm. on Rules, FED. R. Cirv. P. 81(a) (3).
60. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948).
61. See Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in Federal Tax Investi-
gations, 21 TAx L. REv. 183, 216 (1966); Lofts, supra note 22, at 411-12.
62. 200 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1952).
63. The court stated:
[The state statute] which makes confidential communications
between husband and wife inadmissible, does not here control
in view of Rule 43 (a) .... which provides for the widest rule
of admissibility, whether under Federal law or State rule ....
Id. at 280 n.2.
64. Cf. Lofts, supra note 22, at 412-13; Note, supra note 14, at 404-08.
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cision Act, state law governs the question of privileges in ad-
ministrative and enforcement proceedings. That Act provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.65
An initial problem with this argument, however, is that if the
question of availability of a privilege is covered by rule 43 (a),
then it seems that by adopting the Federal Rules in Title 28,
U.S.C., Congress has spoken on the issue and the Rules of De-
cision Act is, by its very terms, inapplicable.6 It should also be
pointed out that since the Act applies to "civil actions in the
courts of the United States," it is somewhat difficult to argue
that it should also apply to proceedings before an administrative
agency.
The most compelling argument for the application of state
law is the view that state statutes that create privileges for con-
fidential communications give rise to substantive rights, as op-
posed to mere procedural evidentiaxy rights, which should be
honored as a matter of policy by both federal courts and ad-
ministrative agencies. 7 Such rights are substantive, it is argued,
because they insure freedom of consultation between a client
and his attorney or accountant, and protect the client's confi-
dences by prohibiting the attorney or accountant from testifying
as to any confidential communications. 68 Rules of evidence, on
the other hand, are concerned with the probative value of evi-
dence and whether the jury will be improperly influenced by it
and hence, are procedural in nature. 9 Thus, just as federal
courts in diversity cases consider privilege to be a matter of
substantive law and, therefore, apply the law of the forum state
under the Erie doctrine,7 0 federal courts in enforcement proceed-
ings and administrative agencies themselves should also defer to
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
66. Cf. Comment, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 382, 386 n.26 (1961). At a
minimum, it seems inconsistent to argue that both rule 43(a) and the
Rules of Decision Act are applicable. Cf. Louisell, Confidentiality, Con-
formity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 TuL. L.
REV. 101, 120-21 (1956).
67. See Fahey, supra note 30, at 493-500; Comment, 49 CALiF. L.
REV. 382, 382-87 (1961).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551,
555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967); Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 220 (1964).
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state law.7 1 At this point, however, a number of federal policies
which would be affected must be given consideration.
Initially it must be emphasized that the sweeping terms of
the statute granting investigatory powers to the Internal Rev-
enue Service72 reflect a congressional awareness that in order
effectively to enforce the Internal Revenue Code, inhibitions on
the power to compel full disclosure must be extremely limited.73
If all state-created privileges were to be recognized, the govern-
ment's ability to gather evidence could be seriously hampered.
While some states might be content to enact an accountant-
client privilege, for which an arguable case can be made by
analogy to the attorney-client privilege, other states might en-
act broker-client, bank-client or other privileges. The resulting
inhibition of the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement powers
probably would far outweigh the tenuous benefit which might
result from protecting client confidences in such areas.74
Another undesirable effect of applying state law in this
area would be the inconsistent administration of federal tax law
which would result.75 Thus, a client's confidential communi-
cations to his accountant would be protected from compulsory
disclosure by the Internal Revenue Service in one state while
similar communications would not be protected in another state.
In addition to the inherent inequity of such an approach, it
could also lead to evasive forum shopping. Since a district
court action to compel testimony must be brought in "the dis-
trict in which such person resides or may be found,"76 a taxpayer
intent on assuring the confidentiality of his communications
with an advisor would likely consult an advisor in a state whose
law would render the communications privileged.7 7 This type
71. Cf. H. HART & H. WECiSLER, TE FEDERAL CounTs AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 697 (1953); Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal
Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 66, 116-17 (1955); Louisell,
supra note 66, at 119-20.
72. The statute is quoted in note 11 supra.
73. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 216; Note, Evidentiary Privileges
in the Federal Courts, 52 CALiP. L. REV. 640, 654 (1964); Comment, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 1030, 1032-34 (1961).
74. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 216.
75. Id.; Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1030, 1033-34 (1961).
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7402(b).
77. See Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1030, 1033-34 (1961). The
client's obtaining his desired protection assumes, of course, that the
federal court would consistently select the law of the forum state to
determine the availability of the privilege, which might well not be the
case. Cf. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 797, 806 (1957).
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of activity would further thwart the evident congressional pol-
icy of minimizing the impediments to full disclosure in Internal
Revenue Service investigations.
A final policy aspect of the choice of law problem involves
the particular status of the Internal Revenue Service investi-
gation; quite often it is a preliminary step toward a federal tax
prosecution.7 8 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure specifically states that the competency and privileges of
witnesses shall be governed by federal common law. 79 If state-
created privileges are available in proceedings before the In-
ternal Revenue Service, the net effect will be to produce the
anomalous situation of a taxpayer's advisor successfully refrain-
ing from testifying during the administrative investigation only
to be compelled to testify at the taxpayer's criminal trial.8 0 In
addition, these circumstances would likely encourage the Serv-
ice to engage in judicial fishing expeditions. It might proceed
with the criminal prosecution when it has insufficient evidence
for a conviction on the theory thai the testimony of the tax-
payer's advisor, which was protected under state law during the
administrative investigation, will be compelled during the trial
and provide the additional evidence necessary for the conviction.
To encourage such a course of action seems undesirable from
the point of view of both the Internal Revenue Service and the
taxpayer.
In balance, considerations of uniformity and equality seem
to require the application of federal law to determine the avail-
ability of a privilege for confidential communications before the
Internal Revenue Service and before the district courts in en-
forcement proceedings. State law and policy must yield to these
pervasive federal interests.8 1
IV. SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
FEDERAL TAX INVESTIGATIONS
The scope of the attorney-client privilege is often narrower
than expected. It is said to extend "only to communications or
78. Cf. Comment, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 382, 387 n.28 (1961); Comment,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 1030, 1033-34 (1961).
79. Rule 26 is quoted in text accompanying note 51 supra.
80. See Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax In-
vestigations, 19 TAx L. Rnv. 405, 412 (1964). Cf. Comment, 67 HAav. L.
REv. 1272, 1273 (1954).
81. See Cohen, supra note 61, at 216; Special Subcommittee on
Formal Internal Revenue Service Question and Answer Representation,
Representations by Counsel at Formal Internal Revenue Interrogation,
18 ABA BULL. SEC. OF TAX. 37, 43 (April, 1965); Note, supra note 73, at
[Vol. 54:67
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
conversations between the attorney and his client and not to
activities engaged in by the attorney on behalf of his client."82
In recent years, however, judicial decisions in a number of
borderline areas have changed substantially the scope of the
privilege. The discussion of these various aspects of the privilege
operates on the assumption that federal law is and will con-
tinue to be determinative of its scope.
A. IDENTT OF THE TAXPAYER AND THE NATURE OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATION
As a general rule it may be said that the identity of the
client does not come within the scope of this privilege.8 3 Two
important reasons for this principle are: (1) every litigant is
entitled to know the identity of his opponent who is instigating
judicial proceedings;8 4 and (2) in most cases the identity of the
client is not communicated in confidence as the privilege re-
quires.88 In certain situations, however, the courts have found
the reasons for the rule inapplicable and have allowed the
identity of the client to be protected.86
One of the early cases upholding the privilege in such cir-
cumstances is Ex parte McDonough.8 7 In McDonough, an attor-
ney had been employed by certain clients to represent them in
matters connected with the investigation of election frauds and
to defend three other persons who were already under indict-
ment for such frauds. The grand jury sought to compel the
attorney to disclose the identity of the clients who had hired
him, but the court held that their identity was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The court noted that the communi-
cation did not involve the furtherance of a criminal act, that it
was clearly intended by the clients to be held in confidence and
654; Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1030, 1034 (1961). Contra, Fahey,
supra note 30, at 499-500; Comment, 49 Cmidr. L. REv. 382, 386-87 (1961).
82. H. BALTER, TAX FAuD AND EvAsioN 5-18 (3d ed. 1963).
83. People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 719, 270
N.Y.S. 362, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENcE § 2318
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
84. See C. McCoRMICK, EviDENCE § 94 (1954); 8 J. WiGMOR ,
supra note 83, § 2313. Cf. Note, Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege to Protect the Client's Identity, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 535 (1961).
85. See note 83 supra. One commentator includes as a third reason
the need of the courts to know that the attorney actually has a client.
See Lofts, supra note 80, at 407-13 (1964).
86. Wigmore recognizes this by noting that "much ought to de-
pend upon the circumstances of each case." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 83, § 2313.
87. 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915).
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that the clients were not parties to any litigation. It then con-
cluded:
[N]one of the various reasons advanced in the authorities for
the disclosure of the name of the client who employed the
attorney is applicable here, in view of the circumstances of this
case. We cannot escape the conclusion that, .. . to require
the petitioner to answer any of the questions ...would be to
require him to divulge a confidential communication made to
him by a client in the course of his employment-a communi-
cation tending to show, and, under the circumstances of this
case, material only for the purpose of showing, an acknowl-
edgement of guilt on the part of such client of the very offenses
on account of which the attorney had been employed to defend
him.S8
A leading case holding that under comparable circumstances
the identity of the client is not protected is United States v.
Pape.s 9 Pape was accused of transporting a woman across
state lines for immoral purposes. At the trial the district court
required Pape's attorney to reveal that Pape had retained him
to defend the woman against an earlier prostitution charge.
The Second Circuit affirmed, quoting from the opinion of the
district judge which states: "There is nothing in the books to
show that the privilege was to extend to the fact of retention of
counsel. No point is made that the employment of counsel
should be shrouded with secrecy."90 The court recognized, how-
88. Id. at 236-37, 149 P. at 568. Other cases upholding the privi-
lege as to the identify of the client include: Elliot v. United States, 23
App. D.C. 456 (1904); Ex parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960);
In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 168 N.E.2d 660 (1960);
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y.S. 631 (Sup. Ct.
1931); In re Shawmut Mining Co., 94 App. Div. 156, 87 N.Y.S. 1059
(1904).
89. 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944).
90. Id. at 783. Judge Learned Hand dissented on the ground that
retention of counsel for the woman "was a communication between
an attorney and client, a step in his own defense .... That direction
to his own attorney in his own interest was as much a privileged com-
munication as any direction would have been, made in the course of
preparing for a trial." Id. Hand's argument seems persuasive. It is
difficult to see how any injustice would have been done had the state
been unable to determine who had hired the attorney to defend the
woman. See Note, supra note 84, at 537. Other cases denying the
applicability of the privilege to the identity of the client include: Beh-
rens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); Mauch v. Commis-
sioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940); United States v. Lee, 107 F. 702
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass.
1958); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 616, 335 P.2d 484 (1959);
In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954); People ex rel. Vogelstein
v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 242 App.
Div. 611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1934).
[Vol. 54:67
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ever, that "there may be situations in which... the disclosure
of the client will result in a breach of the privilege.' '
The leading case involving the identity of a client in a fed-
eral tax investigation is Baird v. Koerner.9 2 This case, it will be
recalled, involved a payment of back taxes by an attorney for
an unidentified client. While the court relied upon state law in
finding the identity of the client to be a privileged communi-
cation, it also explored the rationale of the privilege to deter-
mine whether or not it should apply to such a situation. The
court noted that since no litigation existed, there could be no
necessity for the government to know the taxpayer's identity as
there would be if he had filed a suit against the governments
Also, it was clear under the circumstances that the client in-
tended that his identity be held in confidence by the attorney.
Thus, since the traditional reasons for requiring the disclosure
of the client were inapplicable, the Baird court felt justified in
striking a balance between the policy of the attorney-client
privilege and the policy of full disclosure in favor of protecting
the client's confidences.
The conclusion reached by the court, in light of the facts
involved in this particular case, seems entirely correct 5 In the
normal investigatory situation, the identity of the suspect is
known, and evidence of his activities is sought to incriminate
him. The attorney-client privilege, however, protects the client
from having his attorney compelled to testify as to incriminating
statements made to the attorney, thereby encouraging free com-
munication between the client and attorney. In the Baird situ-
ation, however, the illegal activity of the client was known by
the government and the incriminating link necessary to pursue
a criminal prosecution was the identity of the client. In these
circumstances, then, it seems that the client's identity must be
protected if he is to obtain effective legal representation.96
While the Baird decision was based on state law, any doubts
that the scope of the privilege under federal common law would
not be equally broad were dispelled by Tillotson v. Boughner.9 7
91. 144 F.2d at 783.
92. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). This aspect of the case is dis-
cussed in: Comment, 10 BumTAIo L. REv. 364 (1961); Comment, 49 CALxw.
L. REV. 382 (1961); Comment, 47 VA. L. Rsv. 126 (1961).
93. 279 F.2d at 630.
94. Id. at 631.
95. See Lofts, supra note 80, at 414-15; Comment, 49 CAL'. L. Ray.
382, 390-91 (1961).
96. Id.
97. 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
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Applying federal common law to facts very similar to those in
Baird,9 the court found the identity of the client to be protected
by the attorney-client privilege.
As a general rule, the attorney-client relation is a prelim-
inary fact to be established before any claim of privilege may
be upheld.9 9 Thus in Colton v. United States,00 an attorney
was required to answer questions concerning the general nature
of legal services rendered to a taxpayer. Similarly, an attorney
was required to testify as to the amount and date of fees paid
by a client.' 10 It is difficult to argue with these decisions since
they seem to present no serious impediment to free communi-
cation between the attorney and client.10 2 Nevertheless, apply-
ing state law, the court in United States ?. Ladner'0 3 refused to
compel an attorney to testify as to his fees or to his involvement
in the purchase of a residence for a client.
In some circumstances, however, certain facts of the re-
lationship may be elements of proof of a crime. In such a case,
by analogy to the Baird and Boughner cases, it would seem
that the facts should be cloaked with the protection of the attor-
ney-client privilege. 04 For example, if a taxpayer is accused of
willfully failing to file a tax return and the date of his first
consultation with the attorney was shortly before the return's
due date, that fact might give rise to an inference that there
had been timely advice to file and thus should be privileged. 0 5
B. TnE TAXPAYER'S RECORDS iN POSSESSION OF AN ATTORNEY
Under the "pre-existing document" rule, the attorney-client
privilege may not be asserted to protect documents in the hands
of an attorney which were created prior to the attorney-client
relationship.'0 6 The rationale for this exception to the privilege
is based on the fear that if documents could be withheld by an
98. In fact, the Boughner court noted: "There is little doubt but
that defendant Boughner planned the transaction in the instant case...
in light of the decision of Baird v. Koerner .... " Id. at 665.
99. Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D. Mass. 1958).
See Lofts, supra note 80, at 415.
100. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
101. In re Wasserman, 198 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1961). See United
States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
102. Cf. Burroughs, Attorney-Client Privilege: How Far Can an At-
torney Go in Protecting his Client, 23 J. TAxA.ToN 248 (1965); Lofts,
supra note 80, at 416.
103. 238 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Miss. 1965).
104. See Ritholz, The Commissioner's Inquisitional Powers, 45 TAXEs
782, 788 (1967).
105. Id.
106. See generally 8 J. WiGmOEE, supra note 83, § 2307.
[Vol 54:67
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
attorney as can oral communication, a client could foreclose any
discovery of his documents and records simply by transferring
them to his attorney, even though they would have been subject
to discovery in his own hands. 07 While a client may make an
oral communication to the attorney of a fact which would be
protected by the attorney-client privilege, the client could still
be compelled to reveal that fact unless he possessed an indi-
vidual privilege, such as that against self-incrimination. Were
documents to be protected by the attorney-client privilege when
handed to an attorney, however, production of the document
could not be compelled though it could have been compelled had
the client retained possession. While the client could be ques-
tioned as to his knowledge of facts contained in the documents
or records, such an examination would be of little value where
extensive and complicated records were involved. 08
Conversely, however, it would seem unjust if documents
which were protected by the privilege against self-incrimination
in the hands of the client lost that protection when handed to
an attorney. Such a result would follow from the fact that the
fifth amendment privilege is personal in nature,1' 9 and under
the "pre-existing document" rule documents do not qualify for
the protection of the attorney-client privilege. The undesirable
result of such a situation would be that the possession of docu-
ments protected in the hands of the client by the fifth amend-
ment could not be transferred to an attorney for examination
without becoming subject to production. One court has realis-
tically phrased the problem as follows:
Clearly, if the taxpayer in this case ... had been subpoe-
naed and directed to produce the documents in question, he
could have properly refused .... But instead of closeting him-
self with his myriad tax data drawn up around him, the tax-
payer retained counsel. Quite predictably, in the course of the
ensuing attorney-client relationship the pertinent records were
turned over to the attorney. The government would have us
hold that the taxpayer walked into his attorney's office un-
questionably shielded with the Amendment's protection, and
walked out with something less.110
Wisely the majority of courts have not accepted the gov-
ernment's position and generally have held that documents
which were protected in the hands of the client do not lose
their protection when transferred to an attorney."'3 The ve-
107. See Comment, 74 YAnE L.J. 539, 546 (1965).
108. Id.
109. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
110. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1963).
111. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963);
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hide for reaching this result, however, has been to allow the
attorney to assert the client's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.1 2  In doing so, it was necessary for the courts to dis-
tinguish and by-pass a substantial amount of case law and
it may be questioned whether they have done this successfully
and convincingly."3 A strong argument can be made that a
more proper course to follow in providing the needed protection
would have been to extend the attorney-client privilege to
cover documents which were protected in the hands of the client.
This solution would have avoided a confrontation with prior
decisional law and provided a nonconstitutional rationale for
the result reached." 4
C. Tim Accon-NT Am His WORKPAPERS
No accountant-client privilege i3 recognized by either the
common law or the federal courts in tax investigation proceed-
ings. Thus if communications to ar. accountant or his reports
and workpapers are to be protected, they must be brought within
the scope of other categories of privilege. In many situations
the attorney-client privilege may be available.
The most critical factors in determining the availability
of the attorney-client privilege to protect the workpapers of an
accountant are whether or not an attorney has been retained
by the taxpayer prior to the preparation of the workpapers, and
whether they were prepared at the direction of the attorney or
the client."n
Where an accountant is retained and workpapers are pre-
pared before an attorney is consulted, it seems clear that they
cannot be cloaked with the protection of the attorney-client
privilege." 6  Irrespective of the equity of such a result," 7 it
Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 {2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal.
1956). Cf. 8 J. WIGmORE, supra note 83, § 2307. Contra, Bouschor v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963). The Bouschor case may be
distinguishable, however. See Hochman & Salkin, Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege in Criminal Tax Cases, 43 TAxEs 182, 184 (1965).
112. Id.
113. See Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 539, 541-43 (1965).
114. Id. at 540-45.
115. See How To HANvrx TAX AuvITs, :REEQuESTS FOR RULINGS, FRAuD
CAsEs, An OTHER PnocEDums BEroRE THE I.R.S. 127-34 (I Schreiber ed.
1967); Cohen, Accountants' Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations,
21 TAx. L. REv. 183, 192 (1966); Lofts, supra note 80, at 425-34.
116. "It is entirely clear from the record ... that the documents
... were either disclosed to the accountant... or produced by [him],
prior to their delivery to counsel. Under such circumstances, it is obvi-
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seems to follow logically from the rationale of the privilege,
since the client's communication was not made to an attorney
or to one working under the direction of an attorney as his
agent. In addition, since the workpapers were subject to dis-
covery in the hands of the accountant, it seems equally clear
that transferring possession of the workpapers to an attorney
who was subsequently retained would not bring them within
the privilege.18 The leading case upholding this view is Bou-
schor v. United States" 9 where workpapers and tax returns
had been prepared by an accountant for several years before
the attorney involved was consulted. After the tax investigation
began, the attorney was consulted and he instructed the account-
ant to transfer all workpapers to him. When the attorney was
summoned to produce the workpapers and other material he
had received, he refused, contending inter alia that the papers
were privileged communications. The court, noting that the
workpapers were prepared by the accountant prior to the
attorney's appearance in the case, and that they had already
been reviewed once by Internal Revenue agents, reasoned cor-
rectly that no confidential communication by the client to an
attorney existed and thus the privilege was inapplicable.
Troublesome, however, is the court's view that the privilege
was inapplicable for the additional reason that the ownership
of the documents and workpapers lay with the accountant and
not with the taxpayers. 20 While the question of ownership or
at least rightful possession of workpapers is critical in assessing
the validity of a fifth amendment claim of self-incrimination, its
relevance to the availability of the attorney-client privilege is
ous that no privilege can subsequently arise." Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (N.D. Cal. 1956). See Bouschor v. United States,
316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.
1956).
117. Cf. Lofts, supra note 80, at 434.
118. In United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961), the court
left open the possibility that the privilege may be applicable in such
circumstances by stating: "We do not deal in this opinion with the ques-
tion under what circumstances [accountant-client communications] could
be deemed privileged on the basis that they were being made to the
accountant as the client's agent for the purpose of subsequent communi-
cation by the accountant to the lawyer." Id. at 922 n.4. Assuming the
attorney-client privilege inapplicable, however, it may be possible for
the workpapers or other documents to become protected from discovery
under the privilege against self-incrimination if possession or ownership
is transferred to the client or possibly the attorney. This problem is
explored infra note 119, and accompanying text.
119. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
120. Id. at 456.
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not clear. Where an attorney employs an accountant to pre-
pare workpapers and reports, it seems likely that such documents
would still be the property of the accountant, 121 and yet other
courts have held the privilege applicable in such circum-
stances. 22 Nevertheless, the prudent attorney would be well
advised to obtain a surrender of title from the accountant to all
reports and workpapers if reliance on the attorney-client priv-
ilege is anticipated. 23
Where the accountant is employed directly by the attorney
or by the client at the attorney's request, the status of the ac-
countant's testimony or workpapers, is less clear. One of the
earliest cases to deal with the question was Himmelfarb v.
United States 24 where the attorney retained an accountant
who was present at meetings between the taxpayer and the
attorney. The testimony of the accountant was objected to by
the attorney on the ground that the accountant was an agent of
the attorney and thus the communications between attorney,
accountant and taxpayer were protected. 2 The court held to
the contrary, however, stating: "[The accountant's] presence
was not indispensable in the sense that the presence of an at-
torney's secretary may be. It was a convenience which, unfor-
tunately for the accused, served to remove the privileged char-
acter of whatever communications were made."'126
As might be expected, the Himmelfarb decision has re-
ceived strong criticism. 27 Certainly it can be argued that the
services of an accountant are essential to an attorney if he is to
provide effective legal representation in a tax fraud case. The
accountant can analyze the taxpayer's financial records and
translate technical accounting data into materials more readily
understandable by the attorney. 28 Nevertheless, Himmelfarb
was subsequently approved by the Sixth Circuit in Gariepy v.
United States. 29
121. See Lofts, Procedural Aspects of Tax Fraud Investigations, 45
TAxEs 508, 509 (1967).
122. See United States v. Judson, 338 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); Bauer
v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 388 (D.C.N.D. 1966).
123. See Lofts, supra note 80, at 427.
124. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
125. Id. at 938-39.
126. Id. at 939.
127. See Lourie & Cutler, Lawyer's Engagement of Accountant in a
Federal Tax Fraud Case, 10 TAx L. REv. 227 (1955). Cf. Lofts, supra
note 80, at 430; Lofts, supra note 121, at 509.
128. See Lofts, supra note 121, at 509.
129. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).
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In United States v. Kovel, 3 0 however, the Second Circuit
expanded the scope of the attorney-client privilege to cover em-
ployees or agents of an attorney with more than "menial or
ministerial" duties. In Kovel the accountant, though not an
attorney, was a full-time employee of a law firm specializing in
tax matters. The client was instructed to turn over his records
to the accountant and to make any necessary explanations of
financial transactions. When the accountant was summoned to
disclose statements made by the taxpayer, he refused, claiming
the communications were protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. The court rejected both the argument of the government
that the privilege covered non-lawyer employees of a law firm
only if their duties were "menial or ministerial," and the argu-
ment of the attorneys that a communication by a client to any
employee of a law firm was privileged. 131 In the court's view
the essential element was "that the communication be made in
confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the
lawyer.' 3 2 In applying this principle to the facts involved the
court reasoned:
Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers
in almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases.
Hence the presence of an accountant, whether hired by the
lawyer or by the client, while the client is relating a compli-
cated tax story to the lawyer, ought not to destroy the privi-
lege... ; the presence of the accountant is necessary, or at least
highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client
and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit. By
the same token, if the lawyer has directed the client, either in
the specific case or generally, to tell his story in the first in-
stance to an accountant engaged by the lawyer, who is then to
interpret it so that the lawyer may better give legal advice,
communications by the client reasonably related to that purpose
ought fall [sic] within the privilege; there can be no more vir-
tue in requiring the lawyer to sit by while the client pursues
these possibly tedious preliminary conversations with the ac-
countant than in insisting on the lawyer's physical presence
130. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
131. Id. at 920-23. The attorney's view was rejected on the
ground that "[n]othing in the policy of the privilege suggests that at-
torneys, simply by placing accountants, scientists or investigators on
their payrolls and maintaining them in their offices, should be able
to invest all communications by clients to such persons with a privi-
lege the law has not seen fit to extend when the latter are operating
under their own steam." Id. at 921. Cf. United States v. McKay, 372
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967). The McKay court held that a report pre-
pared by appraisers employed by the attorney for possible use in tax
litigation was not protected from disclosure under the attorney-client
privilege.
132. 296 F.2d at 922.
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while the client dictates a statement to the lawyer's secre-
tary .... 133
In United States v. Judson8 4 the Ninth Circuit followed
Kovel and apparently overruled, sub silentio, its much criticized
earlier decision in Himmelfarb.3 5 In Judson, the attorney con-
sulted by the taxpayer requested that an accountant be re-
tained by the taxpayer to prepare a net worth statement for
the attorney's use in providing adequate representation. Sub-
sequently the attorney was served with a subpoena which di-
rected him to produce the accountant's workpapers and the net
worth statement. In summary fashion, the court upheld the
attorney's claim that the documents were privileged, stating:
The accountants' role was to facilitate an accurate and com-
plete consultation between the client and the attorney about
the former's financial picture. The lower court was correct in
determining that these documents constituted confidential com-
munications within the attorney-client privilege. 13 6
The most recent decision to affirm the liberal view of Kovel
and Judson is Bauer v. Orser. 37 In. Bauer the taxpayers con-
sulted an attorney who retained an accountant to assist him so
that he "could properly advise the [taxpayers] as to their legal
rights.' 38 The court held that workpapers and other documents
prepared by the accountant were protected by the attorney-
client privilege since the communications between the account-
ant and client were made in confidence for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice.189
The Supreme Court has never delineated its view of the
scope of the attorney-client privilege in tax fraud investigations
or, more specifically, to what extent the privilege will protect
the workpapers and reports prepared by an accountant at the
attorney's direction. This issue was recently before the Court in
Reisman v. Caplin,140 but was not decided, since the case was
disposed of on procedural grounds.' 4'
From the cases discussed, it should be observed that work-
133. Id. The Court expressly rejected the rationale of the Himmel-
farb case. Id. at 922 n.3.
134. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
135. See Cohen, supra note 115, at 191.
136. 322 F.2d at 462. This language appears to reject the Himmel-
farb view that the accountant could not be an "indispensable" party to
attorney-client communications. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
137. 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.C.N.D. 1966).
138. Id. at 340.
139. Id. at 342-43.
140. 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
141. See Cohen, supra note 115, at 183-85.
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papers and reports of an accountant in most cases will be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege if the accountant has been
retained by the attorney or by the client at the attorney's direc-
tion. Where the client tells his story to an accountant before
the attorney enters the picture, the privilege will apparently be
inapplicable.142 One commentator has observed that this places
an unjustifiable burden on the taxpayer to understand the legal
technicalities involved in the law of privileged communication
and that, to remedy this inequity, recognition should be given
to a testimonial privilege for accountant-client communi-
cations.143 A more likely solution to the problem is for the
accountant to realize that any communications made to him will
be discoverable and to insist that an attorney be retained and
accounting services be provided only at the attorney's direction.
This practice would seem particularly advisable in the normal
situation where an Internal Revenue Service investigation has
begun before the taxpayer consults the accountant. Immedi-
ately upon learning that the taxpayer is under investigation,
the accountant should explain the legal implications of further
communication and insist that an attorney be retained.
D. THE ATToRNEY PmFomiNG NoN-LEGAL SmvicEs
It should be recalled that in order for communications be-
tween an attorney and client to be privileged, the attorney
must have been acting in his capacity as a professional legal
advisor at the time the disclosures were made. 44 "Not all com-
munications between an attorney and his client are privileged
.... Attorneys frequently give to their clients business or
other advice which, at least insofar as it can be separated from
their essentially professional legal services, gives rise to no
privilege whatever."'145 Thus where the attorney handles fi-
nancial transactions for the client, 46 acts as his business man-
ager or collection agent 147 or gives investment advice,'148 cor-
142. But see note 118 supra.
143. See Lofts, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Tax In-
vestigations, 19 TAx L. REV. 405, 434 (1964).
144. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
145. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
146. See Lowy v. Comm'r, 262 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1959); McFee v.
United States, 206 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1953); Pollock v. United States,
202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953); Toothaker v.
Orloff, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5029 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
147. See Kelly v. Simon, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 888 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
But see In re Schwarz, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 10,061 (D.D.C. 1956), ajf'd
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munications between the attorney and client are not protected
by the privilege. It is easily appreciated, however, that in numer-
ous situations it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to determine the capacity in which the lawyer was acting.
Those situations which have proven most troublesome for the
courts usually involve quasi-legal services performed by an
attorney who also happens to be an accountant and quite often
involve specifically the preparation of tax returns by an attorney
or an attorney-accountant.
In re Fisher149 is an early federal case dealing with a claim
of privileged communication by an attorney-accountant. The
attorney-accountant involved had in the past given legal advice
to the client, but on the occasion in question had been retained
to audit the client's books and sought to protect the client's
records and workpapers prepared during the audit from discov-
ery based on a claimed attorney-client relationship. The court
correctly compelled production of the records and documents.
Where the services performed by the professional are character-
istically rendered by an accountant, such as an audit of the
financial records, it seems clear that the fact that the person
employed happens to be an attorney should not change the status
of what would otherwise be unprivileged communications. 50
In Olender v. United States,151 however, the services per-
formed did not lend themselves to such easy categorization.
Involved was an attorney-accountant who had prepared federal
income tax returns for the client aid a net worth statement
requested by the Internal Revenue Service after the tax investi-
gation had begun. Nevertheless the court concluded, without
apparent difficulty, that the attorney-accountant was retained
as an accountant to prepare a financial statement and income
tax returns, and nothing more.152 Thus, the privilege was held
inapplicable. Of major concern to practicing attorneys is the
court's implied characterization of the preparation of income
tax returns as the work of an account;ant.153 If the preparation
on other grounds, 247 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Schwarz court held
that a list of clients given by a doctor to an attorney apparently for
collection was protected by the attorney-client privilege.
148. Cf. Colton v. United States, 306 :F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
149. 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). See also United States v. Chin
Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
150. See 51 F.2d at 425.
151. 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
152. Id. at 806.
153. Cf. Lofts, supra note 143, at 417-19.
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of income tax returns cannot be a legal service when per-
formed by an attorney-accountant, it would seem to follow that
an attorney who is not an accountant is not acting in his capacity
as a professional legal advisor when he prepares an income tax
return. 154 Consequently, the attorney-client privilege would not
protect statements made by the client to the attorney in con-
nection with tax return preparation and such statements could
be the basis of subsequent civil or criminal litigation against the
client. It should be pointed out, however, that the Olender court
was not faced with the latter situation and that the decision on
the facts before the court was somewhat simplified by additional
circumstances. The attorney-accountant was an employee of an
accounting firm and not actively engaged in the practice of law.
In addition, when a question arose as to whether certain infor-
mation should or should not go into the net worth statement, a
practicing attorney was consulted for legal advice on the matter.
These factors point sharply to the conclusion that the individual
involved was providing services as an accountant, not as a law-
yer, and on this basis the result reached by the court is readily
justified.155 Nevertheless, the court's view is clear that irre-
spective of the particular circumstances involved it did not con-
sider preparation of a federal income tax return a legal service.156
A different view of the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to the preparation of tax returns was adopted by the
Second Circuit in Colton v. United States.157 The government
sought to compel testimony and the production of copies of tax
returns, workpapers, correspondence, memoranda and all other
data relating to the preparation of federal income tax returns
by the attorneys for a particular client under investigation by
the Internal Revenue Service. 5 8  The attorneys subsequently
appeared but refused to give any substantial testimony or turn
over the records requested claiming that to do so would "fla-
grantly induce a violation of their duty to the taxpayer arising
out of the relationship of attorney and client."' 59  The court,
154. Thus the court would apparently include income tax return
preparation in the same category with other non-legal services to
which the privilege would not apply, such as giving investment advice
or handling financial transactions. Cf. text accompanying notes
146-50 supra.
155. See Lofts, supra note 143, at 417-19.
156. 210 F.2d at 806.
157. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
158. Id. at 634.
159. Id. at 635.
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without citing or discussing the Olender decision, assumed the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege stating:
There can, of course, be no question that the giving of tax
advice and the preparation of tax returns-which unquestion-
ably constituted a very substantial part of the legal services
rendered .. are basically matters sufficiently within the pro-
fessional competence of an attorney to make them prima facie
subject to the attorney-client privilege .... But, . . . the au-
thorities are clear that the privilege extends essentially only to
the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in pro-
fessional confidence.1 60
The court went on to conclude that a number of matters con-
cerning which the attorneys had refused to testify, such as the
years during which the attorney-client relationship existed,
remuneration received and the nature of legal services rendered,
were not confidential communications and thus not protected
by the privilege. As to the work]?apers and documents in-
volved, the court affirmed the holding of the district court that:
[The attorney could] withhold any particular confidential
papers which were "specifically prepared by the client for the
purpose of consultation with his attorney" and any of the
firm's memoranda and worksheets "to the extent of any un-
published expression made by an attorney therein of confidences
which had passed between him and his clients."161
In the court's view, however, a blanket refusal to produce any-
thing was unjustified; if the documents were to be protected by
the attorney-client privilege, it was incumbent upon the attorney
to establish that they were confidential in nature. 62
To the extent that the court required the attorney to estab-
lish that the documents in his possession were confidential in
nature and to respond to questions concerning the nature of
services rendered, it has been criticized for placing a "serious and
unjustified" limitation on the privilege.163 It would seem equally
unjustified, however, to allow an attorney's blanket claim of
privilege for everything in his custody to stand unchallenged.
Since the documents remain in the attorney's possession, the
government would be without practicEl avenues to rebut such a
claim unless some inquiry is permitted. The same critic states
that the Colton decision "appears to sanction inquiry into the
statements of the client leading up to the disclosure of items
appearing on the face of the return."' 64  While the opinion is
160. Id. at 637.
161. Id. at 639.
162. Id.
163. Lofts, supra note 143, at 420. Cf. Cohen, supra note 115, at 193.
164. Lofts, supra note 143, at 422.
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not clear on this point, to the extent it does approve such in-
quiry the court is probably incorrect. Invariably there will be
many occasions where the attorney and client will discuss mat-
ters which are of a confidential nature and yet some aspect of
that discussion will eventually appear on a federal tax return.
Surely the appearance of this one item should not remove the
cloak of protection from the client's entire communication. Ir-
respective of the relative merits of this interpretation of Colton,
however, subsequent decisions appear to have received the case
in a different light.165
In Threlkeld v. United States'6 an attorney who also hap-
pened to be a certified public accountant sought to assert the
attorney-client privilege in refusing to answer certain questions
or produce certain documents in connection with an estate tax
return he had prepared. As to the effect of the attorney's status
as a certified public accountant, the court noted that he held
himself out only as a lawyer and not as a practicing accountant
and therefore was entitled to claim the privilege to the extent
of its applicability to the communications and documents in-
volved.1 7 On the question of which communications and docu-
ments were protected by the privilege, the court, relying in part
on Colton, stated:
Any communication by the client with the understanding
that the information would be inserted in the return must be
divulged.... The reason is that, with such an understanding,
it could not be intended to be confidential.
Information communicated by the client with the direction
that it not be inserted in the return or with the direction that
it be, or not be, so inserted in the discretion and judgment of the
attorney need not be divulged .... 168
165. See United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W. Va.
1966); United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
But see Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
166. 241 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
167. Id. at 326. The court seemingly handled this problem cor-
rectly. The mere fact that a practicing attorney also happens to be a
certified public accountant as in Threlkeld should not deprive his cli-
ent of the privilege, no more than the fact that a practicing accountant
also happens to be an attorney as in Olender should bestow on his cli-
ents the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Cf. How To HANDLz
TAX AuDITs, REQUESTS FOR RuLNGs, FRAUD CASES, AND OTHER PRO-
cEDURzs BEFOR TH I.R.S. 129 (1. Schreiber ed. 1967). But see United
States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W. Va. 1966). In Higgins an
attorney-certified public accountant, who was apparently practicing as
an attorney, was allowed to claim his client's attorney-client privilege
with respect to some schedules and workpapers incident to the prepara-
tion of a federal tax return, but others were found to be "primarily
of an accounting nature!' and were held not protected.
168. 241 F. Supp. at 326.
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This application of Colton would appear to adequately protect
the status of the attorney-client privilege doctrine since any
communication which was made by the client in confidence
would be inviolable.169
The most troublesome decision in this area is that handed
down recently by the Eighth Circuit in Canaday v. United
States.70 An attorney practicing as such prepared tax returns
for a client under investigation by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. The taxpayer sought the protection of the attorney-client
privilege to prevent the government from compelling the attor-
ney to testify or to produce documents and workpapers in his
custody. The court affirmed the holding of the district court
that the privilege was inapplicable since the attorney "had acted
not as a lawyer, but merely as a scrivener for [the] defendant.' 171
While the court did not clarify the nature of the work actually
done by the attorney, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances
where an attorney who is retained to prepare an income tax re-
turn would act as a mere "scrivener." Certainly a taxpayer's
purpose in retaining an attorney for such a task is his belief that
the attorney will employ his professional skill and judgment to
minimize taxes and to prepare an accurate return. 72  In addi-
tion, the two cases cited by the cour; in support of its ruling' 78
are either inapposite or directly contradict the decision. Falsone
v. United States 74 did not involve an attorney, but an ac-
countant who unsuccessfully attempted to gain recognition of
169. A second application of Colton reaching a similar result is
found in United States v. Higgins, 266 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. W. Va. 1966).
Involved again was an attorney-certified public accountant, apparently
practicing as a lawyer, who had prepared federal income tax returns
for various clients. The court, quoting extensively from Colton, held
that the schedules and workpapers involved, except those which were
primarily of an accounting nature, were protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege.
170. 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966). This case is the subject of a
critical Comment in 33 Mo. L. REv. 122 (1968).
171. 354 F.2d at 857. The lower court had stated that:
[I]t is patently clear that the function performed by [the
attorney] for the defendant in filling out defendant's tax returns
was the function of a scrivener, and that the documents re-
ceived by [the attorney] from the defendant and the docu-
ments prepared by [the attorney] for the defendant were not
of such a nature as to be the subject of the attorney-client
privilege.
Id. at 857 n.7.
172. See Coment, 33 Mo. L. Rsv. 122, 126 (1968).
173. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
174. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). See
text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
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a state-created accountant-client privilege before the Internal
Revenue Service. Colton v. United States, 75 it will be re-
called, did involve a tax attorney's claim of his client's at-
torney-client privilege, but the court specifically recognized
that tax return preparation was "sufficiently within the pro-
fessional competence of an attorney to make [it] prima facie
subject to the attorney-client privilege."1 76 Thus, based on
either logic or precedent, the decision in Canaday designating
income tax return preparation as the work of a "scrivener" is
difficult to support and should not be followed.
The obvious confusion which exists in this area appears to
be the result of a failure on the part of the courts to follow a
systematic analysis of the factual situations involved.17 7 If an
attorney-accountant seeks to assert the attorney-client privilege
for his client, the court should first inquire as to whether the
professional holds himself out and actually practices as an attor-
ney or an accountant.1 78 If he is an employee of a public
accounting firm or generally holds himself out to the public as
an accountant the privilege should be presumed inapplicable.17 9
If he practices as an attorney and holds himself out as such,
then the privilege should be considered as attaching to com-
munications by the client to the extent the services provided are
within the attorney's professional legal competence. For rea-
sons discussed earlier, tax return preparation should fall within
this category,'8 0 while performing a year end audit of the fi-
nancial records, for example, would not. 8
175. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
176. Id. at 637.
177. The exception is United States v. Threlkeld, 241 F. Supp. 324
(W.D. Tenn. 1965).
178. Id.
179. The presumption could not be a conclusive one, however, since
consideration must be given to that rare situation where an attorney-
accountant who holds himself out to the public and practices as an
accountant, for unknown reasons, decides to provide services of a
uniquely legal nature, such as litigating a case for a client. While such
conduct would likely violate the canons of ethics of both the legal and
accounting professions, this would not justify penalizing the client by
depriving him of the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege.
180. An exception would, of course, exist with respect to communi-
cations which are made with the understanding that they shall be dis-
closed on the return, since the element of confidentiality is lacking.
As to these communications the privilege would not apply.
181. See In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). The fact that
communications to an accountant would not be privileged while com-
munications to an attorney performing similar services would be is not a
basis for criticism of the scope of the attorney-client privilege. This




It has been suggested that many of the problems surrounding
the attorney-client privilege in the tax fraud area could be
eliminated by the recognition of an accountant-client privilege.18 2
Certainly it must be conceded that a substantial portion of the
litigation concerning the availability of the attorney-client priv-
ilege in tax investigations relates to accounting and involves
accountants' workpapers, documents originally transferred to
accountants or services having both legal and accounting as-
pects. Nevertheless, before the recognition of an accountant-
client privilege can be advocated, the need for such recognition
merits close scrutiny, keeping in mind Professor Wigmore's ad-
monition that the doctrine of privilege should be "strictly con-
fined within the narrowest possible limits."18 3
Initially it seems clear that the application of state law and
state-created privileges is not a proper vehicle for gaining recog-
nition of an accountant-client privilege in Internal Revenue
Service investigations. The spectrum of problems which would
be created by such action has been noted previously,18 4 and it
should suffice to say here that the inequities and lack of uni-
formity which would result make this alternative clearly in-
advisable.
The broader question of whether an accountant-client priv-
ilege should be created by federal law must also be answered
in the negative. While it is quite clear that information often
intended to be confidential when communicated to an ac-
countant is presently subject to discovery by the Internal Rev-
enue Service, it seems equally clear that the mere fact that a
client intends a communication to be confidential does not justify
cloaking it with the protection of a privilege. Before a privilege
against disclosure of communications should be recognized, it is
also essential that the injury to the client and the relation
caused by disclosure is greater than the benefit gained by hav-
ing the information available in litigation.8 5 Recognition of an
accountant-client privilege would clearly result in the with-
lege is recognized by the federal common law while none exists for
the accountant's client.
182. Cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in Federal Tax Fraud
Investigations, 17 TAX L. REv. 491, 509 (1962); Lofts, supra note 143, at
434.
183. 8 J. WIGmOPR, supra note 182, § 2291.
184. See notes 72-81 supra, and accompanying text.
185. See J. WIGMoRE, supra note 182, § 2285.
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holding of substantially more information from the Internal
Revenue Service and other administrative agencies and thus
hamper them in carrying out their law enforcement responsi-
bilities. The corresponding benefits which would result from
recognition simply do not justify this curtailment. While past
experience indicates that a taxpayer's case often appears to be
unjustly damaged by discovery of a confidential communication
made to an accountant, it is submitted that adequate protection
can in most cases be afforded if the accountant will recognize
that when his client becomes the subject of a tax investigation,
the accountant should insist on the immediate retention of an
attorney.

